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Abstract What should be meant by a scientific approach to policy and how it might
help create a more appropriate way of reaching decisions? Many years in practical
policy making show that it is part science and part art. Complex systems science,
as a form of story telling, can create links between them. Three aspects of policy
making are considered: (1) the nature of proof in science and decision making, and
how introducing new science into decision making is an under appreciated problem;
(2) optimisation and that, despite optimal solutions not existing, policy makers want
a single solution with unintended consequences left for future generations of policy
makers; and (3) ceteris paribus—other things being equal, and the problem of
deciding which things can be left alone and over what time periods. In policy, proof
is an argument required by investors, regulators, and other decision makers. Proof
must satisfy the beliefs and traditions of the decision maker, even when the former
contradict observation and the latter are flawed, e.g. ‘we have been doing it this way
for thirty years so it must be right’. In policy, the belief in optimisation is particularly
strong, within a tradition that focusses on parts and ignores wholes. Arguably,
individuals do not always optimise and often make decisions by copying others,
opening up new ways of nudging people towards compliance. Also firms may not
optimise due to risk aversion, lack of information, or just focussing on survival.
Even if optimisation were possible, a narrow view on what is being optimised can
lead to missed opportunities, as in the case of the multiple returns of agglomeration.
Also, although innovation is a pillar of economic policy, its necessary dynamics are
incompatible with equilibrium theories. Equilibrium also suggests that ‘do nothing’
is a policy option for no change, rather than drifting into the unknown. However,
‘doing something’ has the additionality problem, namely showing the benefits over
doing nothing or something else. All investment impacts are on the balance of
probabilities. Risk free investment and risk free polices are not possible in a complex
world. What matters is to have a strong story, backed up by strong evidence on the
main elements of the story. Then take a bet.
B. Rosewell ()
Volterra Partners, 56–58 Putney High Street, London, SW15 1SF, UK
e-mail: brosewell@volterra.co.uk
© The Author(s) 2017
J. Johnson et al. (eds.), Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy,




If science is about experiment and testing to ensure only correct hypotheses are
accepted, then art might be about balancing hypotheses which either are not or
cannot be tested and making choices on the basis of broad brushes in primary
colours. There is a strong tradition, at least in English-speaking countries, of seeing
art and science as oppositional, with different cultures and different standards [13].
Complex systems analysis can be seen as sitting between these traditions, and indeed
some proponents of complex systems analysis have seen it not as a science but as
a form of storytelling, which provides a way of describing the one path of history
with all of its contingencies and feedbacks.
In this chapter I want to get behind seeing complex systems analysis as a form of
storytelling and consider how we can use complex systems thinking to create links
between what we think of as science and as art. In other words, complexity science
can offer the potential to cut through between the traditions of science and art and
even to join them up. In addition, I want to use this way of thinking to take forward
how policy making and policy choices can be improved.
I will do so by considering three aspects of policy making and how they might be
changed and developed by the application of relevant aspects of complex systems
analysis. In doing so, I want in particular to expand our appreciation of what should
be meant by a scientific approach to policy and how it might help create a more
appropriate way of reaching decisions.
My policy experience has been largely based in the UK so I will draw on this
as the basis for my argument, but it is relevant to many areas of policy decision
making. The three topics I shall consider look at both concepts and at process.
First, I consider the nature of proof in both science and decision making, and how
this is affected in turn by history and experience. This is especially relevant to the
introduction of a new scientific approach and how its proofs can be incorporated
into day to day decisions. This is an underappreciated problem.
Second, I look at the question of optimisation. Policy makers want to be given
a solution, not a menu. They particularly don’t want a menu of choices whose
outcomes are uncertain because of potential feedbacks. The offer of optimality is
a powerful one, and unintended consequences can be left for a future generation
of policy makers to worry about. Even scenarios are often unwelcome. It is a
real challenge to incorporate an appreciation that optimal solutions don’t exist in
decision making.
Third, I want to consider the venerable tradition of ceteris paribus—other
things being equal. Which other things can be allowed to be equal, and over what
time period is a significant problem. The addition of complex behaviours and
probabilistic rules compounds this difficulty but also allows us to think about it in a
different way. In each of these areas, I give examples of policy debates and policy
decisions.
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2 Proof and the Force of Tradition: Transport Policy
2.1 Proof in Policy
Giving evidence one day at a Planning Inquiry into the building of a new bridge
across the Thames, I was asked what standard of proof there was for my contention
that increased accessibility would create jobs and encourage more residents. The
planning inspector was an engineer by background and pointed out that he had
standards of proof for the number of times a piece of metal could be stressed before
it failed. What, he asked, was the equivalent for my models?
It has to be said that my answer did not convince him. Our models had
used a combination of fuzzy logic clustering of London’s locations, densities
and accessibility and related the cluster centres to create a relationship between
population and employment densities and accessibility that controlled for all the
unknown and unmeasured reasons that might have affected the outcomes. This
approach was innovative and had not previously been agreed by any planning
authorities. There was therefore a risk to the planning inspector in accepting a new
way of arguing.
Second, I argued that transport was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
improved economic performance. It was therefore impossible to identify a ‘transport
only’ effect of the new bridge, since development site availability, suitable skills
and training policies and the availability of jobs outside the locality would all play
a part in providing the outcome. This integrated way of thinking created severe
puzzlement. The reductive approach to economics in the last half century or so,
supported by econometrics and multiple regression analysis, creates a mind set in
which the aim and object of analysis is to separate out individual effects and to
control the remainder.
In two important respects, therefore, my evidence stepped outside tradition. We
lost the case (not entirely for this reason) and a necessary bridge across the Thames
is still to be built.
2.2 Models, Proof and Tradition
One recommendation of the planning inspector into the Thames bridge was to
construct a particular kind of model, approved by the Department for Transport.
This model describes the interactions between land use and transport. It therefore
incorporates at least one feedback mechanism that might be important.
Such a model, known as a Land Use and Transport Interaction (LUTI) model [5],
starts with the traditional transport model framework. It therefore fits into a familiar
framework. This framework has been built up in the UK over a period of 50 years
or so and has some important features for the way in which decisions are made.
First it rests on principles of welfare economics. An underlying assumption is that
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public investments generate non-monetary benefits, since monetary potential will
already have been captured by private profit seeking investors. This is a very strong
assumption, which I will examine further in Sect. 4. At present, I concentrate on
what these non-monetary benefits might consist of. First, the separation of general
economic from welfare benefits allowed the analysis of the transport system to
be separated from the rest of the economy. Decisions about transport investments
could be delegated to a department with control over this area. Its budget would be
allocated to the best of the projects and a technology grew up to estimate these.
Welfare benefits became synonymous with the time savings that travellers could
make with a new transport investment. Trip demand was separated from this, since
that was determined elsewhere by other economic forces and an underlying growth
assumption. The bigger the time savings, the greater the benefit and these could be
set against costs to generate a benefit cost ratio and a hierarchy of projects worth
pursuing.
Of course, time savings need to be monetised to be set against costs in this
way, and techniques of evaluation using stated preference and some observations
were created to enable a standardised method of evaluating time saved for leisure,
commuting and business travellers. The current values mandated for this purpose
are shown in Table 1 taken from the Department for Transport’s latest guidance.
Table 1 UK department for





LGV (driver or passenger) 12.18










Averages of all working person 27.07
Values of working (employers’ business) time by mode
(£ per hour, 2010 prices, 2010 values)
Trip purpose Market price
Commuting 6.81
Other 6.04
Values of non-working time by trip purpose
(£ per hour, 2010 prices, 2010 values)
Source: [7]
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In practice, it became clear that new roads simply filled up and the putative
time savings seemed to evaporate. A major investigation by the Department of
Transport’s Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment Committee
(SACTRA) [4] concluded that the model was still valid as in conditions of perfect
competition, time savings could be transferred into real economic benefits and thus
the valuations were still relevant. Tradition could be upheld.
As a policy maker and proponent of this model once said to me; “We’ve been
doing it this way for thirty years, so it must be right”. The force of tradition thus
absolves it proponents from a standard of proof, so long as the assumptions, for
example of perfect competition, are held to be inviolable.
In a neat twist, SACTRA recommended that the adjustment between perfect
competition and the reality of imperfect competition should be 10%, an adjustment
that can be added to any benefit calculation—and therefore means nothing at all in
terms of prioritising projects.
The strength of the tradition of perfect competition is worth exploring as it has
particular implications for the implementation of a complex systems approach.
Everyone would admit that no such actuality exists, but the search to attain it
is embedded in policy in a number of places. I will return to the implications
for competition policy in Sect. 3, where its implications for optimality are very
important.
Here the implication is for the feedback between the transport system and the
economy. If the assumptions of perfect competition are dropped, then the separation
of transport evaluation and economic benefit must also be dropped. But this is very
hard for policy makers to do.
2.3 Agglomeration
A good example concerns the acceptance of the principle of agglomeration. This
process, first described by Alfred Marshall [10] and rediscovered and developed
by scholars such as Fujita, Krugman, Thisse and Venables [6, 8], shows how co-
location can affect labour market effectiveness, innovation, and productivity. These
all count as externalities to the concept of perfect competition as the existence
of a firm affects the existence of other firms, contrary to the principles on which
perfect competition is based. So it became possible to take these into account, and it
makes a significant difference to the impact of transport systems which allow such
agglomerations, principally major cities, to grow.
Marshall (8th edn., p. 223) wrote ‘When an industry has thus chosen a locality
for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the advantages which people
following the same trade get from near neighbourhood to one another. Themysteries
of trade become no mystery; but are as it were in the air . . . if one man start a
new idea it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and
thus it becomes the source of further new ideas’. Contemporary examples of this
is the high-tech industry of Silicon Valley and theatre districts in cities. Marshall’s
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arguments included the shared use of expensive machinery, the pool of specialised
labour, and other advantageous factors for co-location of similar industries. Apart
from these synergies, co-location offers the befits of complementarity as seen, for
example, in the modern shopping mall or the departments of a large hospital. As
Marshall argued so cogently, the benefits in agglomerations go beyond the befits to
a particular sectors, but also to other sectors and indeed to the whole [10].
Proponents of complex systems analysis will easily see that the concept of
an externality links readily to developing rule-based behaviours which can either
include or exclude particular effects. The impact of one agent’s behaviour on
another’s is also a key consideration in building any complex system, in which
outcomes can follow different paths depending on how these interactions emerge.
In traditional policy analysis however, these interactions are a distraction. The
process of agglomeration carries uncertainties and intuition would suggest that it
intensifies with scale. Indeed, an inspection of the relationship between density and
wages across the Local Authority Districts of the UK shown in Fig. 1 lends itself to
this conclusion.
Such a conclusion undermines the traditional analysis of time savings which
always and everywhere have the same relative values, and in which perfect
competition—as the nomenclature implies—has perfect outcomes. It is instructive
to consider how attempts to include this element of a complex system—the idea of
agglomeration—have fared in the policy framework of the UK’s transport decision
making system.
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Fig. 1 Employment density against earnings differential; 2008–2012 average [17]
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The framework of the idea was already present in the literature when I proposed
that it should be used in the analysis of a new commuter railway in London. We
produced estimates of the net additional value that could be created by being able
to have more productive jobs in central London, where wages and employment
density were highest. We showed that the main constraint to such job creation was
the transport system.
These estimates were attacked on several grounds. The simplest was to argue that
if more productive jobs existed they would be created anyway and less productive
ones squeezed out so that the welfare basis for investment remained intact. The
more sophisticated was to take the econometric and reductive approach. A priori, it
is argued, more productive jobs will be taken by higher skilled people. These skills
are independent of the location in which they are exercised and therefore we must
distinguish between the return to skills and the return to the location in which they
are exercised. If highly skilled people went to work in some other location, they
would still reap a benefit from their expertise. A further step is to estimate these
differential returns, including to individual industry sectors.
By contrast, I argued that there was symbiosis between skills and location that
undermined this separation. Should the skilled and enterprising be prevented from
maximising their opportunities, their skills would not remain constant but be likely
to decay. In the process of agglomeration however, skills would be enhanced and
rewards to qualifications increase. The reductive approach and cross section data
analysis misses this.
This argument was a step too far. The reductive approach prevailed and a system
of elasticities between density and output estimated. These are incorporated into
guidance, just like the prescription of the values of time to be applied.
There is a twist. The traditional view, hallowed by time, has prevailed. The
estimates of agglomeration are allowed as a ‘sensitivity test’. Moreover, they have
been divided into two parts. One part is called ‘pure agglomeration’. This is an
estimate of the impact of my productivity on yours, a density effect. It is accepted
that this is not covered by the standard analysis. It can be significant but not
enormous. The much larger impact is from creating new jobs which are more
productive. In a recent analysis of an extension to one of London’s underground
lines, the pure agglomeration effect was 15% of the size of the impact of creating
better jobs. But in the perfectly competitive world these jobs would always be
created, and hence the traditional analysis still wants to ignore this. And even
this impact is only a marginal one. In the traditional analysis everyone who wants
to work can, and therefore it is only the net increase in productivity that can be
measured.
2.4 Privileging Tradition Over Evidence and Proof
The force of tradition is clear in this story. New aspects to policy making are slow
to be incorporated, and resisted. It is much easier to follow rules than to invent new
ones and it requires much energy and resources to try and change the paradigm.
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This brings me back to the question of proof. My response to the planning inspector
was that in social science, where experiment was hard to do and impacts took a
long time to work out, standards of proof do not exist in the same way as they do in
engineering. Proof of the traditional models is as difficult as that of newer complex
systems.
The traditional approach to economics assumes that all agents have the same
motivation and that as a result all available opportunities will be taken up. Such
assumptions can easily slip from assumptions into articles of faith which do not
require proof; they are taken as being self-evident. The decision maker is muchmore
interested in creating a rationale for decision making than in debating the distinction
between an assumption and an article of faith.
The system of producing an analysis of time savings by putative travellers in the
future creates a clear ranking of projects with monetised benefit cost ratios. What
could be more attractive? Hallowed by decades of practice, it becomes embedded
into a handbook of guidance which would, if printed, probably be high enough to sit
on. Fortunately it is now web-enabled. But this in turn creates a framework which
is harder and harder to challenge as each piece of the jigsaw of regulation looks
perfectly sensible on its own and only becomes worrying when you realise how the
assumptions build up.
LUTI models, recognised as appropriate in guidance are a case in point. They
identify relationships between land use, whether for employment or residential
purposes, and the transport system. They therefore rely on the ability to measure
how land use changes in response to transport changes at small geographical levels.
It assumes a set of trade linkages between industries to govern employment land
use. There is no direct evidence for such relationships: they are entirely assumed
from national data and there is no basis for assuming that such relationships hold at
a local level. Equally past changes in land use are as much governed by planning
regulation as by individuals’ choices: such regulations are assumed constant in the
models. Without a clear understanding of the source of assumptions, evaluation of
models cannot be done. But if a modelling approach has been privileged in guidance,
then the source of assumptions will be submerged into an assessment of the results,
which in turn will rest on what seems plausible to a set of policymakers. This is no
sort of proof of the validity of the results but is more akin to relying on judgement
while calling it a model.
A similar process can apply even to the more venerable models of transport
behaviour which are also used in the LUTI process and which are the basis of the
time savings approach. Transport models assume that people will use the most time
efficient route for their journey. They solve for the optimum trip patterns, given a
set of origin and destination choices. Such models can become complicated and
usually work in minutes of time. One minute saved is valued at the same rate
per minute as 5 or 15minutes. Wait times and interchange times are given their
own multiples of minutes. Such penalties are based on observation, usually fairly
limited. The more fundamental assumption is that people do indeed optimise their
travel behaviour on the basis of time. Calibration of these optimisingmodels is made
against considerable amounts of data. If the optimising algorithm does not produce
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the travel pattern observed for the model’s point of time, an adjustment vector is
added to ensure that the existing travel pattern is replicated.
This clearly creates a problem for testing future transport scenarios. Is the
adjustment vector held constant? Should it decay? These important decisions tend
to become opaque and technical rather than recognised as privileging judgement
over proof. Complex systems analysis has made some headway, but very little
into these decisions. It has been overshadowed by the overarching assumption of
optimality and indeed a particular form of rationality. Having examined this from
the perspective of transport decisions, I now turn to how it plays out in industrial
and competition policy.
3 Optimality and Optioneering: Competition Policy
and Innovation
3.1 Optimality, Perfect Competition, and Policy
No aspect of policy has been more governed by the concepts of optimality and
perfect competition than policy towards industry. Anti-trust legislation rests on the
assumption that monopoly is bad as tending to raise profits and prices, while perfect
competition with lots of small firms each without the power to affect prices will
drive down costs and benefit the consumer.
In the static and stable world of equilibrium economics this makes perfect sense.
Markets can be researched and understood, while firms are able to know what else
is happening in their marketplace. Markets are easily defined. In this stable world,
prices cannot just be set for today but in fact theory shows they must be set for all
future time too In the real and messier world this paradigm leads to much effort to
deciding where a market stops either in product terms or in geographical terms.
I once undertook a piece of analysis on the nature of the market for diesel-
powered water pumps. These are largely used on construction sites to remove water
from foundations or when there had been flooding. Was this a separate market from
that for electrically powered pumps which undertook exactly the same role but were
less frequently used on sites?Were larger pumps, used generally for more permanent
purposes, a different market again? The boundaries are always fuzzy. With enough
ingenuity, it is quite often possible to show a complete continuum of competition.
Regulation has tried to cut through this with the concept of SSNIP, a Small but
Significant Non-transitory Increment in Price. The underlying thought experiment
considers the likely consequence if a firm makes such an increase. Does competition
bring this back again, or is it possible for the firm to keep its gains?
All of this assumes however a market in which it is possible for consumers
to be well informed and in which all firms have similar motivations. Both firms
and consumers are optimising either their profits or their utility. These economic
concepts are grounded in an even more venerable tradition than transport decisions.
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The idea that firms seek profits and consumers seek utility go back to Adam Smith,
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham.
However, the proposition that an ideal system exists in which they are maximised
is of later date and was essentially created by the formalisation of the neo-classical
system after the SecondWorld War, notably by Paul Samuelson. Competition policy
is based on the identification of, and imposition of, such an ideal system. The break-
up of AT&T into the ‘Baby Bells’, prevention of various mergers and acquisitions,
have all rested on this idealisation of profit and utility maximisation [12].
3.2 Complex Systems, Regulation and Decision Making
A complex systems approach to market decision making might tell a different story
with potential for a different approach to regulation and decision making. I want
to use three different aspects to illustrate this. However, in all three we are much
further away from seeing complex systems approaches being operational than in
transport analysis.
The first aspect I want to examine is market entry. Whether markets are
contestable is a key feature in competition analysis. What are the barriers to entry?
Do new firms survive? In a dynamic system, firm survival might be low, and yet
the pressures exerted could still create market discipline for an incumbent operator.
Ormerod and Rosewell [11] calibrated a model of market entry on the UK telecoms
market. New firms had a choice about the scale of their entry and therefore their
costs, and they faced an incumbent which had a variable rate of reaction to such
entry. New entrants could not tell in advance how far the incumbent would react,
and indeed the reaction itself could vary.
We showed that in many of the possible outcomes the incumbent maintained
a large market share but that it did so only when it reacted in a competitive way.
An inflexible incumbent would eventually be competed away and a new incumbent
emerge.
The report was compiled to describe how market evolution could occur to the
telecoms regulator which was suspicious that the incumbent was engaging in anti-
competitive behaviour rather than in fact reacting competitively.
The research did not assume that firms engaged in profit maximising behaviour,
but did assume that they were seeking profit. In standard theory such behaviour
would lead to maximum profit if there are no economies of scale and everyone
knows everything. A step is made in policy to say that such a position can be
enforced. Indeed this is what central planning purported to do. Once the ideal
amount of production has been decided upon this equilibrium set of instructions
is sent out. The potential success of this is demonstrated by the failure of the USSR,
but it lingers on, a subject to which I return in Sect. 4.
Here, I want to focus on whether firms or people are likely to be seeking
either profit or utility. This is especially relevant to the regulation of natural
monopolies, such as the water industry, electricity and gas distribution, and so
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on. Regulators who work on the assumption that their industry can be described
by maximising behaviour can be surprised when their regulatory framework has
surprising consequences.
3.3 The Myth of the Utility Optimising Consumer: Copying
and Nudge
It is hard to know where the trade-off lies for consumers between quality and price.
This is especially difficult if quality is binary. Either the water is safe to drink or
it is not. Either the electricity system is robust and reliable, or it is not. A standard
utility model suggests that all aspects of utility are divisible but this is clearly not
the case. Moreover different groups of consumers not only might have different
preferences as individuals but create communities of interest in which a spectrum
of interests becomes polarised. The treatment of noise in aviation is a good case
in point. Analysis of preferences suggests that noise can be valued such that it is
relatively unimportant against the benefits of additional flights. However a reading
of press coverage or attendance at interest group meetings would suggest something
entirely different.
People who will tell you that they are not affected much by aircraft noise will also
tell you that it is a very important issue. Copying the opinion of others appears to be
just as significant as individual independent opinion. This immediately undermines
a key assumption of standard analysis and means that we need a more complex
systems view which takes this into account.
Unlike much of a complex systems approach, this insight has been both
popularised and taken up by governments as the concept of nudge. Thaler and
Susstein [14] produced a summary of the potential for the policy as if it were always
beneficent. This is interpreted as framing policy in a way to make it more effective in
changing behaviour. Curiously it has been taken up most strongly by environmental
policy makers and the tax authorities. Tax collectors use variants on a theme which
suggests that everyone else has paid, so you should too. Environmental policy uses
a similar approach to encourage recycling and reductions in greenhouse gases.
Another variant is to frame the policy choice as opting out rather than opting in: most
recently to pension savings. The UK government has a Behavioural Insights Team
(http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk) dedicated to finding new ways to ‘nudge’ its
citizens towards complying with its policies.
The analysis of copying behaviour was pioneered in relation to internet
behaviour, with such experiments as how music downloads were affected by
knowledge of others’ choices and companies such as Google, where Hal Varian
is Chief Economist, have large research departments focused on such behaviours.
Nudge is, however, more a mechanism for policy implementation, rather than policy
making. Once a policy is decided, then how are citizens to be made to implement
it? From the wearing of seat belts, to stopping smoking, to a willingness to recycle
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or observe speed limits, citizen compliance and acceptance is crucial. Enforcement
is one route chosen by police states, in others persuasion and social norms become
more important.
However, in this chapter I want to focus more on policy making than on
implementation. Whatever route is chosen to ensure compliance with a policy, the
prior question is whether it is the right policy to have. What this brief discussion of
behaviouralmanagement does show is that to assume that consumers—or citizens—
are continuously maximising an internal utility function is misplaced. What they
care about is as likely to be influenced by the experience of others as by their own
internalised preferences.
3.4 Policy and the Myth of the Profit Maximising Firm
What of the profit maximising firm? This construct has been both idealised
and demonised. Proponents of the standard model have shown that the ideal
firm, pursuing profit or shareholder value, will create the most efficient firm and
produce at least cost so long as anti-competitive forces are not allowed to stand
in the way. Opponents of capitalism such as the Occupy movement (http://www.
occupytogether.org), see the pursuit of profit as undermining morality, exploiting
consumers, and driving pollution and tax avoidance.
The theory of the ideal firm says that the pursuit of profit leads to an elegant
solution in which the marginal cost of producing an extra unit is just balanced by
the additional revenue and therefore the greatest efficiency in which only ‘normal’
profit can be earned. Firms don’t actually need to know where this point is as
competition will find it out by moving resources from less profitable to more
profitable enterprises until it is found. In the real and complicated world, most
businesses are not only unable to know what marginal costs and revenues are, they
are concerned more fundamentally about survival. I once undertook a project which
required the calculation of such marginal costs and revenues to determine whether
a set of plants were at the lowest point on their cost curves (for policy purposes).
It was almost impossible to know, and for most of them the potential economies of
scale were such that it was hard to see that they would survive. They did not.
Talking with chief executives, finance directors and other managers over decades
it is hard not to conclude that they are pursuing profit with anything like singlemind-
edness. Many other motivations intrude. Investmentsmay be seen as potentially very
profitable, but the risk is too scary for the management. Others may want a quiet
life, and simply do what the regulator tells them. In a more realistic motivational
world, neither firms nor consumers may behave as the limited rationality of the
economist predicts. In this world, the policy maker faces unintended consequences
of, for example, price regulation.
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3.5 Innovation and Networks
The area of policy where motivational richness is most important is that of
innovation. Innovation is inherently risky and most new ideas may never come to
fruition. It is not the same as invention, which is having the new idea. Innovation
is making it happen and spread in the wider world. It is crucial to the process of
economic growth but remains outside the standard model, where equilibrium is a
static concept which can be described by market shares and price competition for a
known product. In practice, innovation is a major battleground for firms. Traditional
enterprises will try to stifle the newcomer, or even innovatorswithin their own ranks,
while upstarts create new products or new processes which undermine incumbents.
The emerging digital economy illustrates how firms controlling older forms of
communication have struggled to compete with the new behemoths of the digital
age. Earlier, the advent of large scale computing undermined the producers of
accounting machines and were themselves then forced to adapt to the introduction
of the microcomputer and personal access to computer power. The fax machine
became ubiquitous and has now almost disappeared again, to be replaced by emails.
The mechanisms by which innovation happens are neither well understood nor
well adapted for policy. Neither science nor art but the blend between them and
complex systems analysis has concentrated on this area (e.g. Antonelli [1]).
Innovation does not arise simply through individual decisions. That might happen
with an invention but to turn an idea into an effective and widespread phenomenon
requires networks. Networks in turn work through supply chains as well as peer
groups. Indeed research we undertook in the Manchester region suggested peer
groups were more likely to promote protection of an idea than its percolation.
Supply chains were more likely to disseminate a new idea [16].
Networks can either facilitate or squash dissemination of an idea. If the first steps
along the network do not pass it on, it dies. Quite a bit is now understood about
different sorts of networks and their potential to generate a cascade in which the
whole network is affected by something new. Neither science nor art has mastered
how to characterise these in practice, and what mix of close and weak linkages are
most likely to generate successful new ideas. Policy in this area has been particularly
affected by the operation of vested interests which has tended to think in terms of
peer groups. Similar firms are encouraged to form groups. But such networks may
be as easily determined to stop innovation as to foster it, so that they maintain their
current positions. A recent study of industrial clusters in the UK showed that no
successful grouping of innovative industrial firms had been achieved by policy [2].
3.6 Innovation and Optioneering
Innovation is essentially a search and optioneering exercise; it is hard to imagine
what might be meant by equilibrium in innovation, since successful innovation is
by definition a disruptive phenomenon in which there will inevitably be losers as
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well as winners. Government has a tendency to confuse invention with innovation
and to believe that inventors also make good innovators. This is not often true. It
is more often the case that designers and inventors need business partners who can
make practical their ideas, focusing on scaling production, finance and markets.
Optioneering can be interpreted as taking a systematic ‘engineering’ approach to
the selection options where there is no clear optimum. It tries to put in place clear
and structured processes for decision making and regulation. In the private sector the
messy realities of there being no optimal solutions to complicated multidimensional
problems make some variant optioneering essential if firms are to survive. As we
have seen, the public sector remains wedded to the possibility of optimisation,
despite the poor decisions that arise.
Complex systems approaches to these issues have made little inroad in policy,
because they offer few simple prescriptions, either to what constitutes effective
competition or how to promote successful innovation. A call to improve networks
is hard to implement and has no easily visible signs of success. Competition
is still bedevilled with the attractions of the word ‘perfect’ and ‘optimal’. The
well-established results that these cannot be achieved are forgotten. A particularly
important aspect to this is the focus on comparative statics, the comparison with a
‘do nothing’ outcome and a ‘do something’ policy. Benefits of do something are
the difference between the two. What matters as much as whatever the policy might
be is the ‘do nothing’ scenario with which it is to be compared. This brings us to
the troubling question of ‘ceteris paribus’—other things being equal. It is to this
assumption and its consequences that I now turn.
4 Other Things are not Equal: Cities, Devolution,
and Growth
All modelling limits its scope. Outside the scope of the model, it must be possible
to hold that no factors of importance will affect the focus of the model. In my
discussion of transport models, for example, the need to make a trip is outside the
model and is not affected by the provision of transport systems.
4.1 The Do Nothing Policy Option
The great advantage of a complex systems approach is that it challenges assump-
tions on what should or should not be included in the model. In doing so, it adds
dimensions of time and space which are missing from the comparative statics
approach in which it is fatally easy to believe that the ‘do nothing’ future is easy
to understand.
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If a social system were in equilibrium then the policy of doing nothing would
leave it unchanged. The reality is, of course, that social systems are constantly
evolving and the policy of doing nothing does not mean that the world will not
change—it means that the world will change in ways that may be contrary to policy
objectives.
The evolution of models of the macro-economy illustrates this. In their earliest
formulations, such models, which I both learnt and taught in the 1970s, essentially
excluded economic growth. This was independent of the general economy and
indeed was a more advanced subject. Macro descriptions of the economy focused
more on the relationship between consumers and spending, investors and savers,
and how government filled the gap. Time lags were afterthoughts and add-ons. This
fundamentalway of thinking about the economy is still influential and can be seen in
the writings of Paul Krugman [8], for example, where it seems obvious that if there
is a gap between the putative and actual output of the economy, then a mix of interest
rate adjustment and government borrowing fills the gap with no consequences.
4.2 Central Planning
This analysis is in turn the intellectual heir to the central planning movements influ-
ential in western socialist parties and in the socialist administrations of the Soviet
and Chinese bloc. Central planning substitutes the model for the messy business
of actual markets, firms and consumers. Capturing all necessary information in the
model it should be possible to identify the ideal set of outputs to use all available
resources and to produce the best possible outcome. Central planners can proclaim
an end to boom and bust. In a static world, perhaps it is possible to envisage a model
being able to capture all the information that could possibly exist about products,
and all the information about consumers’ tastes and preferences. Even so, the mind
boggles at the computer power this might require.
Out in the real world, of course, consumers not only have a wide variety of
tastes and preferences, not always consistently, and moreover change their minds.
What was my favourite dish last year seems boring this year. I’ve just seen someone
check train times on an iPhone in a minute or so and I want this new product. The
messy business of markets is the non-equilibrium process of exploration.Will a new
product sell? What will happen to previously existing products? The strength of
market processes is that they create a mechanism for finding out which is relatively
painless. Experiment is possible and consumers have direct mechanisms for making
their choices known.Markets processes certainly have flaws, but they have generally
served us well in creating economies with longer life expectancies, lower child
mortality and where poverty is measured more in a lack of consumer durables than
in malnutrition.
In spite of its clear failure in both Soviet Russia and in China, however, central
planning still has adherents. The intellectual current that believes that the man from
the government will know best is very powerful, especially since it is supported
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by the men (and some women) from the government whose role it is to do the
planning and create the policies. Quite often, the bureaucratic view that competition
is wasteful and profit inappropriate dominates.
It is worth examining these views more carefully as they are very important in
the policy process. In addition, they interact with the important institutional context
in which policy decisions are made. A good illustration of these issues relates to
development planning, the role of infrastructure and local powers.
The UK is notable for its degree of centralisation. In London, for example, the
Mayor of London only controls about 5% of his budget directly and with full
fiscal control. Most spending comes through central government allocations and
a multiplicity of sources. A report compiled for the Greater London Authority in
2010 by the London School of Economics [15] concluded that spending allocations
were so complicated they were impossible to understand and as result it was also
impossible to develop local prioritisation.
In Sect. 2 I argued that, for example, transport was necessary but not sufficient for
economic development. It is at a local or regional level that the interactions between
transport and other policies can be made apparent and real. This is complexity in
action. Lord Deighton [3], in his task force to look at maximising the benefits from
investment in High Speed rail makes effectively the same point when he argued
that the local authorities around each station location should have a growth and
development plan to take advantage of the new connectivity. The challenge of course
is that the station locations have generally been chosen to maximise the efficiency
of an operational railway, rather than to maximise the economic opportunity. Not
surprisingly, the relevant authorities have been coming back to say that the locations
are not well placed to be fit for this purpose.
4.3 Options Versus Optimality: The Dynamics of Policy
Formulation
The transport planners, on the other hand, have taken development for granted and
been unable to think in option development terms. The order in which decisions
have been taken have governed the range of possible options which can then be
pursued. In the case of High Speed rail, the ordering seems to have started with
the fastest routes between a small group of cities. This then constrains possible
station locations, and in turn what development potential there might be. A different
ordering of priorities could potentially produce a very different plan, and more of
a debate about the trade-off between speed, stops and the line of route. However,
at the outset, no-one asked the cities what inter-city transport improvements would
be most effective in generating improved economic performance. That priority was
only identified later. Lock in has then taken place as the drawing board is never a
blank slate.
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I learnt this when building the case for economic development generated by a
new cross-London railway. At the outset I challenged whether this was the ‘right’
railway. I was still learning how complex decision making works in practice! I was
advised to keep quiet about this question. I was told ‘this might not be the ideal
railway, but it was one we are able to build. Stop this and it will be another twenty
years of re-engineering and even then it won’t be ‘right” I learnt this lesson well.
The best can be the enemy of the good, and the time frames for decision making,
procurement and project management should not be underestimated if a project is
to stick to budget.
Everybody has a tendency to think that what they do is hard, while others have
it easy. Good project design and management is about the understanding that it is
all hard and each discipline has its challenges. Meeting these challenges takes time
and exists in locations. The right people in a meeting with the right information will
make a very different decision, driving a project in a better direction than either the
wrong people or inadequate information will be able to do.
The case for Crossrail indeed rested on this idea—that getting people together
makes a difference to outcomes for the economy as well as for individual projects.
In turn the dynamic that makes this possible includes the motivation to deliver that
drives decision making. Competition and profit are part of this dynamic. In a static
world, then competition is indeed wasteful and profit unnecessary. But in a world of
change then competition and profit are part of a discovery process about what works
and what can do well. The world is a world of options not of optimality.
This brings us to the challenge of understanding what makes a difference—what
is additional, and what happens in any case.
5 Conclusion: The Additionality Bugbear
A complex, non-equilibrium approach to policy is not an easy one. The standard
model, in which an equilibrium solution exists and can be found, is much more
comforting. It is particularly noteworthy that even so, this requires setting aside the
results of second best solutions. Lipsey and Lancaster [9] showed many years ago
that if any part of an economic system is sub-optimal in standard terms, then making
an apparently positive shift in one part cannot be guaranteed to improve the fitness
of the system as a whole.
A non-equilibrium approach, by contrast, requires the policy maker to start from
first principles with a description of all the relevant aspects of the problem in
question. There is no presumption at the outset about maximising behaviour, and
elements of the system can only be ignored if they can reasonably thought to be of
minor importance.
This produces both a different description of a situation and also potentially a
very different description of the impact a policy might have. This is the additionality
problem. What is the difference between the outcome without the policy change and
that with it? What additionality can be ascribed to the policy change?
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In the standard model, where there is continuous optimisation, additionality is
very hard to achieve. All profitable investments will be undertaken, and additions
can only be made in terms of welfare which then has to be given a monetary value,
e.g. reductions in obesity are valued in terms of additional years of life, which is
then monetised according to earning capacity and healthcare costs.
In a non-equilibriumworld, there is no reason to believe that all profitable invest-
ments will be undertaken. This is the most important conclusion to reach. However,
this is not the same as the ‘Keynesian’ syndrome in which full employment is a
matter of arithmetically adding up spending and if there is insufficient employment
just adding the government ingredient. That is just as static an approach as the neo-
classical one in which we are always at the only possible equilibrium.
In a non-equilibrium world, something is always changing and the do nothing
scenario does not really exist. At the very least, it is necessary to consider whether
the future is following the same path as the past. Nor is it necessary to construct
complicated models to understand this. When I first became Chief Economist for
the Greater London Authority, the task was to consider long term employment
prospects. The narrative was simple.
Over the previous 20 years, employment in the business services sectors had
grown at a steady pace, while manufacturing employment had massively fallen
away. Essentially a million jobs in manufacturing had been replaced with rather
more service sector posts. Since manufacturing employment was now a rump, the
question became one of whether this long term service sector trend could and
would persist. We concluded that London’s position in the world economy and the
forces of globalisation means that it could persist, so long as there were no external
constraints. The most significant of these was the transport system, followed by poor
school quality.
Do nothing, in other words, and there was a risk that the relatively recent
upward trend in total employment could come to a halt. Address the underlying
infrastructural problems, and there was a good chance that total employment could
continue to rise. Policy in London focused strongly on both aspects, and increased
transport investment and improved school results followed. So too did increased
employment, which then followed the trend that had been identified.
This narrative remains a strong one, but it is important to note that it rests on
probabilities. Can I be sure that the policies created the framework without which
employment would have stalled? This returns me to the question posed at the
beginning of this chapter because the answer is no. In a complex, non-equilibrium
world, all policy impacts are on the balance of probabilities. For that matter, all
investment impacts are on the balance of probabilities too. No investor knows in
advance that her analysis of the likely outcomes is correct and bankruptcies are
common.
Risk is not only inherent ex ante but cannot be entirely mitigated. Things do
actually go wrong and portfolios contain poor investments as well as, hopefully,
good ones. However, the fact that things have gone wrong does not mean that the
judgement was bad in the first place. Risk free investment, and risk free policies are
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not possible in a complex world. What matters is to have a strong story, backed up
by strong evidence on the main elements of the story. Then take a bet.
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